The international context of Morocco's stalled democratization by Cavatorta, Francesco
  
 
 
 
 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
OF MOROCCO’S STALLED 
DEMOCRATISATION 
 
Francesco Cavatorta 
School of Law and Government 
Dublin City University 
Glasnevin, Dublin 9 
Ireland 
E-mail: Francesco.Cavatorta@dcu.ie 
Phone: +353-1-700 7858 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Introduction 
 The literature on transitions to democracy is very large and can count both on 
theoretical works and a number of case-studies that can be drawn upon to understand one 
of the most relevant political events in the life of any country: regime change. In 
theoretical terms, the literature has seen the emergence of interpretative schools that 
highlight the main tenets of democratisation.1 When it comes to case studies, processes of 
democratisation have been examined across continents, in diverse cultural contexts and 
with regard to different systems of authoritarian government. The vast majority of these 
studies have been carried out within the confines of comparative politics and according to 
Grugel ‘the home of democratisation studies has traditionally been comparative politics.’2  
This means that, with some notable exceptions, the literature has suffered from a lack of 
engagement with international relations. The result has been a marginalisation of 
international variables as key explanatory factors in favour of domestic variables. This is 
also the case in the works of scholars who first introduced the international dimension 
such as Huntington3 and Whitehead,4 although the latter seems to have recently revised 
his position. Thus, the process and the outcome of a founding moment in the life of a 
country have been explained as if occurring in a vacuum.  
More recently, there have been efforts made to deal with this gap and there have 
been calls to bridge comparative and international politics when examining regime 
change.5 This paper follows this path and presents a theoretical discussion that includes 
international variables into the study of regime change and empirically examines the case 
of Morocco.  
 Before looking at the theoretical issues, it is necessary to highlight the reasons 
behind the choice of Morocco and tackle the methodological difficulties that exist when 
selecting only one case. There are three reasons why the choice of Morocco is valid. First 
of all, the comparative literature on transitions tended to neglect the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA). For instance, in his wide-ranging study, Huntington did not 
mention the MENA at all in spite of the liberalising trends that the region experienced in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Secondly, Morocco saw its high hopes dashed and today it is 
assigned to the category of liberalised autocracies. These are countries ‘tempering 
authoritarianism with pluralism’6 and ‘with their ultimate reliance on the supreme 
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authority of the monarch or the president, [they] provide a kind of virtual democracy.’7 
Thus, explaining a failure can contribute to the understanding of the process of 
democratisation just as a successful case can.8 Transitions to democracy can fail, or at 
least stagnate, and if international factors are part of the explanation, it is important to 
highlight their influence. Finally, Morocco can be considered a paradigmatic case in 
terms of the relationship that exists between political liberalisation, Islamic opposition 
and international acceptance of such movements. The rise of Islamist parties during 
transitions in the Arab world has important repercussions for the West-dominated 
international community both at policy-making and normative levels.  
 The selection of one case study to make general inferences about a theoretical 
framework is considered problematic.9 This study accepts that there are important 
limitations to the examination of only one case, but the in-depth investigation of Morocco 
can highlight trends that can be generalised to other similar cases and there is today a 
substantial scholarship that defends a methodology based on a single case study.10  
 
The International Dimension: a Framework of Analysis 
 For a long time, the study of transitions assumed that ‘democratisation [was] a 
domestic affair par excellence.’11 In summarising the spirit of the literature, Yilmaz 
noted: ‘democratic transition has been one particular field of study in comparative 
politics where the dismissal of international factors has been more pronounced than in 
other fields.’12 There are two fundamental reasons that explain why the domestic focus is 
so pronounced to the detriment of international variables.  
On theoretical grounds, it is difficult to have a shared definition of what 
constitutes the international context. Given these definitional difficulties, it is problematic 
to link international variables to domestic change, as there is no agreement to what the 
external environment actually is and how it might operate. This does not mean that the 
international context is not somehow incorporated in the analysis. Most scholars cannot 
ignore the external environment, but they treat it as having only a very marginal effect on 
the process of transition. Furthermore, the poor theoretical conception of the external 
environment leads inevitably to think of international variables in structural terms. This 
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marginalises external active and specific policies that international actors may take and 
that may have an impact on transitions through their linkages with the domestic actors. 
On practical grounds, it is particularly difficult to find the evidence that would 
point to a causal mechanism at work between international factors and domestic change. 
The combined effect of theoretical and practical difficulties contributes to the 
unwillingness of transitology to engage with international variables. 
 In spite of such difficulties, it is becoming increasingly awkward to exclude 
international factors from the analysis of regime change.13 A number of scholars 
attempted to incorporate the international context in their studies of democratisation, as it 
seems beyond doubt that major shifts in the distribution of power in the international 
system and global political and economic trends contributed to a number of 
democratisations.14 However, they ultimately concluded that domestic factors still prevail 
when it comes to explaining the pattern of development of a transition. For the most part, 
scholars such as Whitehead and Pridham did not take on board definitions and theoretical 
tools from other traditions and remained faithful to the literature on comparative politics, 
which neatly separates external and internal factors. The impact of their attempts should 
not be dismissed, as it was the first step to encourage others to pursue the examination of 
the international dimension, but it should also be recognised that they do not conceive of 
the centrality of international factors.  
Whitehead, for instance, argues that the external dimension has a ‘limited’ impact 
during the consolidation period, but not before then. For example, the role played by the 
European Union during the Spanish, Portuguese and Greek transitions is that of a 
‘facilitator of democracy’ thanks to the carrot of membership that is on offer. In his 
analysis, the EU does not directly exercise policy-making influence on the domestic 
bargaining process between ruling and opposition elites, which characterises the 
development of transitions in a complex game to set up new political arrangements. For 
his part, Huntington argues that there are powerful international triggers to transitions, 
but then proceeds to explain the course of regime change only through the same domestic 
bargaining process. All this points in the direction of seemingly ‘fixed’ resources and 
‘objectives’ that the domestic actors have when they play the ‘game’ of transition and 
excludes the possibility that external actors may actually modify such resources and 
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objectives throughout the game itself therefore altering the outcome. Domestic actors 
react to ‘domestic events’ during a transition in order to improve their position, but just as 
they adapt to changed internal conditions, they may also be very aware that they need to 
adapt to external actions. At the same time, external actors can change their direct 
policies according to what the domestic ‘game’ generates in terms of political dynamics. 
A rather more complex game involving both the external and the internal is a more 
plausible interpretative framework.   
In addition, both Huntington and Whitehead make a very limited use of the 
‘international’ and confine it to one specific phase of the process of transition (although 
they disagree on the phase to focus on), but the assumption could be made that if external 
factors have an impact, they do so during all the phases of the transition.         
 Crucially, a number of recent studies attempted to capture the centrality of the 
international dimension through the contamination of comparative politics with 
international relations. Yilmaz has put forth a prominent study developing an open model 
of democratic change.15 Also, Gillepsie and Youngs focus their attention on the role 
played by the European Union in the Mediterranean16 and Cavatorta examines the role of 
external variables in the failed democratisation of Algeria.17 These studies attempt to look 
at transitions in a more encompassing manner and refuse to a large extent to assume that 
such important processes can take place in a virtual vacuum. 
 However, within this limited literature, it emerges a strong bias towards structural 
approaches. For instance, Hamanreh’s approach to ‘the global wave of political 
liberalisation’18 affecting the region centres only on structural economics. In his 
explanation, it is the capitalist international system that drives domestic changes and in 
the late 1980s this meant that structural adjustment programs destined to introduce 
market oriented reforms were an agent of democratisation in the Arab world. While this 
is an important point, it fails to address the politics of the international system and 
through its structuralism makes transitions seem predetermined in terms of outcome. In 
such a model, there is very little room to manoeuvre for the domestic actors, as they are 
conceived as being completely at the mercy of externally generated constraints.
 Yilmaz’s contribution is possibly more effective, although still too ‘structural.’ It 
is a valuable attempt to make sense of the international dimension of transition to 
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democracy through the use of international relations theory and through the connection 
between domestic actors and their external environment in terms of cost and benefit 
analysis for the actions they undertake and the strategies they pursue. In addition, through 
the use of Wallerstein’s theory, Yilmaz highlights how semi-peripheral states ‘have been 
rapidly losing their control over the movements of people, capital, and information in and 
out of their boundaries.’19 However, there are two points of criticism. First of all, it seems 
that Yilmaz’s contribution is limited to the consolidation phase of the transition and this 
poses a ‘timing’ problem. If international factors were active at the end of a transition, 
why would they be inactive during the other phases? The second criticism that can be laid 
at Yilmaz’s door is his reliance on world system theory, which is not an entirely 
convincing theory, as Cox argues.20    
 In order to avoid such pitfalls, the international context should be defined 
according to a mix of structure and agency and could be conceived of three different 
types of pressure that countries experience. These are: 
• Structural pressures generated at international level, which lead countries in the 
system to conform to specific political and economic requirements in order to fit 
into a West-dominated system.  
• Ad hoc policies adopted by the leading nation-states in the system, which aim at 
influencing the domestic distribution of resources among actors to achieve their 
most preferred outcome in line with their national interest. 
• External shocks that condition the domestic bargaining game. These shocks take 
place outside the country under examination and cannot be controlled by domestic 
actors.  
In this framework of understanding, structuralism is tempered by both international 
and domestic agency because explanations of complex political phenomena are seldom 
‘mono-causal’ and often see a dynamic relationship between agency and structure. This is 
also the crucial point where some concepts imported from the classic realist school of 
international relations could be useful and where the previous literature’s emphasis on 
structuralism should be tempered with the introduction of the ‘agency’ of specific actors. 
The acceptance of some realist concepts such as power and interest does not mean that 
the all theoretical claims realism makes should be taken on board, but it simply indicates 
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that the recent excessive focus on liberalism (with its pro-democracy stances) and on 
normative foreign policies might be misplaced. States and other international actors still 
take action according to their interests and the effects these actions have are still 
dependent on power. For instance, policies aimed at exporting democracy are not 
primarily about the establishment of democracy per se, but about security. Democracy is 
not exported because of its inherent normative superiority to other political systems, but 
because it is seen as the best means to achieve stability and security. From this, it follows 
that the possibility of the emergence of a ‘bad democracy’ (i.e. an Islamist party in power 
through democratic procedures) is a threat to the pursuit of democracy and therefore such 
an outcome should be avoided, if possible, in favour of ‘good authoritarianism.’ This fits 
in quite well with the realist emphasis on attaining specific ‘goals’ for the benefit of one’s 
state with the consequent marginalisation of moral behaviour.     
 The innovation of this framework of understanding rests on the introduction of two 
analytical dimensions, which countries should be categorised on. These dimensions 
‘frame’ the three types of pressures outlined above. Regarding the first dimension, there 
is the position of a country in the international economic system. In this context, the 
contribution of those who highlight the relevance of structural approaches should be 
recognised, but, at the same time, the international economic system should be 
overestimated as an explanatory variable. Thus, the international economic dimension is 
a relevant tool of analysis because of the type of international pressure that can be applied 
by a range of actors (i.e. conditionality). In a highly interdependent economic system, it is 
very difficult for any country to be isolated from the global economy and be able to 
pursue policies in tension with mainstream economic wisdom without suffering 
consequences, but such mainstream vision is the product of the stronger actors in the 
system, who promote it to benefit from its implementation. This is in line with the 
precepts of classical realism, which postulates that leading countries will implement the 
policies that in the short-term ensure the pursuit of their ‘interests’ and guarantee their 
security.  Once the economic position of a country is determined within the system and 
how changes there might affect the powerful states active in the region, it becomes 
clearer if it is more or less prone to feel changes at the international level. It is for this 
reason that any effective theoretical framework that wants to incorporate the international 
 8 
dimension has to identify the position of the country under examination in economic 
terms.  
 On the second dimension, there is the position of a country in the political 
international system. In this case as well, realism can become a contingent useful tool of 
analysis because it allows the ranking countries in terms of their relevance for the leading 
actors in the system.21 Some nation-states are extremely important for their geo-strategic 
location and regime change in these states tends to have more relevant repercussions 
externally than if it were taking place in states at the margins of the system. It is for this 
reason that external actors acquire an interest in the outcome and attempt to influence 
how regime change proceeds. Thus, an analysis of the geo-political and geo-strategic 
surroundings of a country is the key to understanding how external actors may be 
involved, directly or indirectly, in the calculations and strategies of domestic actors 
because of the spill-over effects on the region. Radical change has profound 
consequences internationally, as a new government in power may behave very differently 
from the previous one and therefore impinging on the interests of its neighbours and of a 
range of international actors (i.e. Iran in 1979). This geo-political thinking is not limited 
to nation-states, but is a feature of non-state actors as well. With regards to this, it is 
important to re-introduce the notion of ‘pivotal states.’ A pivotal state is defined as ‘a hot 
spot that could not only determine the fate of its region but also affect international 
stability.’22 The concept is used to denote the importance of certain nation-states across 
the globe with respect to the dominant actors in the system and their interests. Dramatic 
changes within what powerful international actors consider a pivotal state are therefore 
monitored with much greater attention and attempts are made to influence the outcome of 
domestic struggles for control of the government. It follows that there are nation-states 
that are more important than others for their potential capacity to affect regional and 
international stability. In the case under examination the United States and the European 
Union certainly see the countries in the region as pivotal in their security strategy and a 
number of non-state actors are equally concerned with such developments, leading them 
to attempt to modify the distribution of resources among domestic actors.  
   These two dimensions are only useful if some a priori assumptions are clarified 
and accepted. First of all, it is necessary to emphasise that, short of military invasion, it is 
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the domestic actors who are formally in charge of the transitional game. It is up to the 
different factions within the ruling elites and within the opposition to play the game out, 
as they try to implement their strategies to arrive at their most preferred outcome. It 
follows that the role of international factors should be analysed in this context. However, 
this does not make them less central to explanation. In fact, such external variables can 
have a significant impact by altering the distribution of power and resources (through 
material inducements or disincentives or through ideological legitimacy) of the domestic 
actors, which in turn has an effect on how they will act.23    
  Secondly, it is assumed that processes of regime change are mostly path-
dependent and that therefore it is imperative to analyse actors and their actions informed 
by strategies and objectives. This does not mean that structural approaches are not useful, 
as they provide the necessary context within which such actions take place. The levels of 
socio-economic development or structural economic and political transformations play a  
certain role, but structural explanations run the risk of predetermining outcomes, which 
instead are largely dependent on decision-making. This is the reason why the focus is 
here on agency and less on structure and follows the line of inquiry suggested by Quandt 
in his work on Algeria.24  
 Thirdly, it is fundamental to temper the realist assumption about the role of nation 
states and their centrality in international politics. While powerful states in particular 
remain the most important actors in the system, there are multiple international actors 
participating to the transition game and they influence domestic societies and actors at 
different levels and in different manners. It is therefore important to analyse the role that 
international financial institutions, multinationals and transnational bodies all play.  
 Finally, it is important to establish the normative value and meaning of 
democracy in the literature on transitions. This aspect deserves a longer discussion 
because it is a key element in understanding transitions in light of the international 
dimension. Far from being the essentially contested concept it is in political theory, 
democracy is a well-established model in transitology and, even more importantly, it is 
also an objective model for policy-makers. One of the main tenets of transitology is 
indeed the coincidence existing between democracy and the specific type of it that is 
western-style liberal democracy. This, not coincidentally, happens to be the mode of 
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government of the most powerful states in the international system and the model 
preferred by international financial institutions. When a process of political liberalisation 
begins in any given country, the population within it determines the validity of their 
democratic choice only up to a point. In fact, full democratic legitimacy and credentials 
depend on final analysis on a process of external recognition. The outside world judges if 
the process of regime change can be qualified as having been successful or as having 
failed. The problem with this is that the only accepted version of successful democracy is 
a western one. This is exemplified by Schmitter and Karl’s work on the essential features 
of democracy.25 While highlighting that democracy does not require the same set of 
institutions across the board, their definition is clearly minimal and coincides with the 
procedural version. This is not per se negative; it simply confirms that any process of 
regime change that is attempting to arrive at a democratic society has a very well 
established internationally sanctioned blueprint.  
While not being necessarily a negative development, it is nevertheless 
problematic. First of all, it pre-empts certain policies or institutional solutions from being 
adopted thereby restricting the options available to domestic actors when it comes to 
political, economic, legal and social arrangements. Secondly, there is the problem of 
cultural adaptation, which is particularly acute in the Muslim world where large Islamic 
movements tend to be seen as enemies of democracy by definition.26 This in turn 
influences external policies towards them and towards the other domestic actors. For 
instance, if policy-makers cannot conceive of an Islamic democracy, they will be unable 
to accept a process of transition, which legitimises Islamic parties. Finally, there exists 
the problem of pigeonholing the new democracies into a pre-conceived role, which serves 
the dominant actors in the system. 
 To summarise, it is the contention of this study that international factors play a 
central role in processes of regime change by affecting the cost and benefit analysis of 
domestic actors and by restricting the options available to them through the normative 
value attached to the meaning of democracy, which has a considerable external 
component. It is also the contention of this paper that these international variables have 
an impact throughout the whole process of transition and they are not simply limited to 
one of the phases of it. Through the use of two different dimensions and their 
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interactions, it is possible to have a theoretical framework that can be useful guide to 
explore specific processes of regime change. In this context, it is useful to emphasise that 
the structural approaches used so far are not quite satisfactory because they limit the 
‘definition’ of international context and seem to predetermine the outcome of regime 
change. This is not really the case because of the role of agency. Specific ad hoc policies 
can radically modify the domestic actors’ structure of incentives and therefore an 
examination of leaders’ actions undertaken according to Machiavellian ‘situation-bound 
knowledge’ is necessary.27 A more dynamic model that analyses internal-external 
linkages is potentially more useful. Also, it is important to re-evaluate the recent notions 
that the international environment does not operate any longer according to realism. 
There are certainly weaknesses in realism), but this should not obscure the fact that much 
of international politics is still played out according to notions of power, promotion of 
interests, security guarantees and interferences from centres of power in the affairs of 
weaker actors. Policies of democracy promotion should be seen in this light. 
 The next section will analyse the case of the Moroccan transition according to 
some of the hypotheses that the theoretical framework provide. In order for the 
framework to be considered useful and having some explanatory power, three tasks 
should be fulfilled and evidence should be found for these claims. First of all, the initial 
decision to open up the political system should be linked to both international structural 
changes and ad hoc policies implemented by external actors and should not simply be 
attributed to an autonomous domestic decision. Secondly, there should be evidence that 
the democratisation process developed with the central contribution of external factors, 
which changed the incentive structure of the domestic actors playing the game. Finally, 
given that the Moroccan transition is ultimately stalled, it should be investigated whether 
external factors contributed to this or not.    
 
Morocco’s stalled democratisation: 1983-2004 
 Since independence, Morocco has had ‘a political system based on authoritarian 
pluralism.’28 This should not obscure the fact that the country has been for a long time 
‘an authoritarian state that kept people in line by intimidation and abuse.’29  
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 By keeping in mind the two dimensions outlined in the previous section, we can 
have a better picture of Morocco’s international position. From an economic point of 
view, the country has been integrated into the international economy for most of its post-
independence existence by virtue of its links to the West. The absence of vast amounts of 
natural resources to rely on and the presence of a large agricultural sector meant that 
strategies of development were state-led, but they were also favourable to some sort of a 
market economy. In geo-strategic terms, the country always had substantial importance 
for the West, as it was one of its key allies in the region during the Cold War. Its strategic 
location combined with the prestige of the monarchy made Morocco a key state, whose 
domestic political developments had important repercussions. The relevance of Morocco 
did not disappear after the end of the Cold War. If anything, its relevance for American 
and European interests in the area increased due to the necessity of reliable partners in a 
volatile region. To this day, ‘Morocco is generally well respected by world powers as a 
stable constitutional monarchy…and an Islamic voice of moderation.’30 In addition, the 
Kingdom has been important to the US for its friendly relations with Israel.31
 Morocco made a number of tentative moves towards the establishment of 
democratic governance and it is therefore quite difficult to point to moments in time that 
could be identified as the beginning and the end of the transition. However, there are 
events that can be used as a departure and an endpoint of the Moroccan democratic 
experiment for the purposes of analysis. The choice is somewhat arbitrary, but a turning 
point could be identified with the arrival of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund on the Moroccan scene in the early 1980s.32  
The intervention of international actors in the key area of economic policy-
making seemed to be a signal of further changes to come and the country experienced an 
easing of press censorship, the release of some political figures from opposition parties to 
participate to local elections and the call for new parliamentary elections. These were 
indeed held in September 1984 and the Socialist Party (a true opposition movement at the 
time) fared rather well. Moutadayene argues: ‘during this period, the political system was 
greatly shaken, which added to and certainly culminated in the acceleration of 
democratisation.’33 This does not necessarily indicate that Morocco was undergoing a 
serious political and institutional shake-up and that the period was devoid of 
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contradictory actions, but it signalled that increased engagement with the international 
community could have political repercussions. The high point in this long transition was 
reached in 1997/1998, when King Hassan II launched his alternance initiative. Following 
the relatively free and fair parliamentary elections of 1997, parties that had been 
previously in opposition formed a new government in 1998. The King delegated some 
real powers to this new government and ‘by inviting opposition groups into power, one of 
the key principles of liberal democracy – the rotation of political power between groups 
through elections – ha[d] been applied.’34 Soon after launching the alternance, King 
Hassan II died and his son Mohammed VI succeeded him. His initial steps were ‘framed 
within the project of transition designed by his father.’35 The new King demonstrated a 
willingness to accelerate the process of democratisation by firing the powerful Minister 
of Interior and by ‘launching campaigns against illiteracy and poverty [which] earned 
him the name King of the Poor.’36    
 Despite the length of the process, democratisation failed to take hold and the past 
few years have seen a return to authoritarianism. The 2002 parliamentary elections were 
far from being free and fair and saw the renewed exclusion ‘of a peaceful movement 
expressing authentic opposition, which reflects the political aspirations of the masses’ 37 
(the radical Islamic association Al-Adl Wal-Ihsane led by Sheikh Yassine). Finally, 
following the terror attacks in the United States and the Casablanca bombings of May 
2003, the royal court reintroduced special dispositions restricting civil and political 
rights. While the country has not reverted back to full authoritarianism, ‘it is likely that 
Morocco is no closer today to a decisive democratic breakthrough than it was four 
decades ago.’38 Democratisation has stalled. 
 If we take the early 1980s as the beginning of a new phase in Morocco’s political 
life as Maghraoui suggests, it emerges that on of the key factors triggering such a choice 
was the economic crisis the country experienced. The severity of the crisis led to bread 
riots quelled by the security forces, but repression was not the only answer and the king 
introduced a small degree of liberalisation. It is interesting to note at this stage that 
Huntington had identified the world economic crisis of the early 1980s as one of the 
factors triggering moves towards both economic and political liberalisation across the 
globe. It seems that Morocco was no exception to the trend. According to Moutadayene 
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‘the economy …underwent a structural crisis which resulted in a crucial drop in GDP, 
deterioration of monetary and financial balances, increase in unemployment and a fall in 
purchasing power.’39 If the hypothesis of the relevance of international factors in 
initiating the process of liberalisation is to be confirmed, there should be evidence that 
the economic crisis was due to external factors and that the domestic elites responded to 
such pressures through political openings.  
 Regarding the origins of the economic crisis, there is agreement that ‘the country 
was severely affected by the recession in the world economy.’40 The severity of the 
recession hit Morocco hard, particularly because it came at a time of high external debt. 
The recession compounded some of Morocco’s structural economic problems, although 
the Moroccan economy had fared quite well during the 1960s and 1970s. Precisely 
because the economy had been doing quite well, the impact of the ‘external’ on the 
‘internal’ is significant. Thus, it can be argued that the international economic crisis had a 
considerable impact in the collapse of the economy, even if the country was doing well 
until then. In addition, the role of the worldwide debt crisis seems to confirm the fact that 
international variables beyond the control of peripheral countries have a substantial 
impact on their domestic policy choices. The crisis forced the King to call on the services 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), which supervised a 
far-reaching program of economic reforms. Layachi points out that ‘Morocco was the 
first country in North Africa to engage in structural adjustment (SAPs)’41 and while 
aggressive liberalisation was successful in terms of macro-economic indicators, ‘it did 
not improve the lot of most people.’42 The decision to involve international financial 
institutions in rescuing the economy was far from being a fully autonomous decision. In 
fact, it was a decision almost dictated to the King by the international environment. As 
Najem argues, a new development paradigm for the Third World had established itself, 
‘which stressed economic liberalisation, especially free trade and privatisation as asserted 
by theorists and policy-makers.’43 It would seem that turning to the IMF and the World 
Bank was the only strategy available to Hassan II to salvage the economy and that the 
resulting social problems due to the implementation of SAPs were countered with 
political openings.  
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 While it is not particularly problematic to link the Moroccan economic crisis with 
the world recession and to link market-oriented reforms with the work of international 
financial institutions, the causal mechanism between decision-making in the economic 
and political sphere is admittedly tenuous. What seems to emerge from the evidence is 
that the decision to open up the political system was entirely domestic and was based on 
the objective of regaining legitimacy and pre-empting tougher opposition. It is clear that 
external state and non-state actors did not really put any political pressure at the time on 
Hassan II to embark on political change. The IMF and the WB, unlike today, were not 
concerned with the political changes that should accompany economic reforms. For the 
reforms to work, transparency and accountability would have been necessary, but these 
actors refrained at the time from intervening in the political sphere. On their part, 
Morocco’s democratic allies, the United States and France, were untroubled by 
Morocco’s authoritarianism and democracy-promotion had yet to become a key foreign 
policy objective. What mattered at the time was regional stability and, in turn, the ‘state 
and the regime benefited to a great extent from Morocco’s transnational and international 
engagements.’44 Thus, there is really no evidence to suggest that pressure to reform the 
political system was applied and the role of international factors is limited to the 
triggering of the economic crisis. The abstention of key actors from promoting reforms 
points in the direction of the relevance of ‘agency’ in processes of transition.  
 Different conclusions can instead be drawn from the analysis of the period of 
democratisation that characterised the 1990s and from the failure of consolidation. The 
hypothesis is that during that time, both structural and actor-led external pressures had a 
considerable impact on the incentive structure of all domestic actors.  
Before proceeding with the analysis it is however important to identify the three 
main domestic actors involved. The most important one is the King. The other two actors 
are the so-called democratic parties and the Islamist movements. This differentiation is 
rather simplistic because it assumes that Islamist groups are not democratic and it is also 
an instrumental differentiation in the sense that it seems to legitimise anti-democratic 
behaviour when it is directed at Islamist movements, but it is a common one particularly 
at policy-making level These three groupings have been affected to varying degrees by 
the external environment. 
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 When it comes to the monarchy, it emerges that the external pressures to continue 
on the path of democratisation have been rather weak and, while some encouragement 
came from Western allies particularly at the end of the Cold War,45 pressure to reform 
was never strong. No specific direct policy was devised to increase the costs of 
authoritarian rule from the two main sponsors of the country: Frances and the United 
States. Only the European Union attempted to encourage political reform by linking it to 
economic benefits for the Kingdom, but the policy has been contradictory and 
inconsistent.  
The reluctance of external actors to seriously promote democracy can be seen in 
the following examples. When it comes to France, uncritical support for the monarchy 
has been the basis of French-Moroccan relations since independence. All French 
presidents, irrespective of their ideological background, co-operated very strictly with the 
Moroccan monarchs. French aid to Morocco is very significant and it represents the 
largest foreign contribution to the Kingdom (1.4 billion francs for 1998 only). In addition 
France is the ‘primary’ lender of funds and also the largest donor when it comes to EU 
funding.46 Such a financial effort from Paris does not include measures of debt 
cancellation that are periodically applied. Very little conditionality is applied to promote 
real institutional changes.47 All this points in the direction of a very ‘realist’ French 
foreign policy based on the assumption that stability in the region can be achieved 
through support for the monarchy.  The 1994 La Baule initiative, when Mitterrand stated 
that French aid would be linked to democratisation, seemed to have an impact on Hassan 
II, but only in the short term, as France quickly demonstrated that ‘cosmetic’ changes 
would be sufficient to obtain French funds. The fear of the rise of political Islam is 
uppermost in Paris and support for the monarch never really wavered in the face of such a 
‘threat.’  
When it comes to the EU, expectations of true normative behaviour have also 
been misplaced with respect to the Maghreb. By the mid 1990s, the European Union had 
begun to pay much closer attention to the southern bank of the Mediterranean and it 
launched the Euro-Mediterranean partnership in 1995 as a multilateral framework to deal 
with economic, political and social issues in the area. The Commission had identified 
political and economic reforms in the countries involved as the two priorities the 
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partnership would tackle. This relationship should have been centred on the promotion of 
democracy, but EU security considerations in relation to the Maghreb are generally of a 
much more diffuse and socio-economic nature. Romeo affirms that ‘they arise 
overwhelmingly from the issues of migration and Islamic revival’48 and Youngs details 
these concerns as well.49 To this, it should be added that economic liberalisation took 
precedence over democratic political reforms. Thus, even the EU refrained from seriously 
pressurising the Moroccan government into implementing real democratic changes and 
seems to be satisfied by façade democratic gestures destined for the international public 
opinion. The other Mediterranean members of EU have also strengthened their links with 
Morocco (even at military level), leaving issues of democracy-promotion aside. Spain has 
been particularly active in this respect.50  
For its part, the United States always supported the Kingdom. This is exemplified 
in the United Nations where the US used their influence to have former US Secretary of 
State James Baker appointed to solve the issue of the Moroccan occupation of Western 
Sahara. Baker has drawn up a plan that seems to legitimise Moroccan claims to Western 
Sahara in opposition to the rest of the international community. In sum, dependence on 
foreign loans and aid could lead Morocco to face enormous issues of ‘conditionality’ 
from the outside, but external actors do not use this potential tool of pressure in a 
coherent manner. Also, all leading external actors guarantee political legitimacy because 
‘for its principal allies and economic partners [US, EU and France], Morocco seems to be 
an example that needs to be followed [by other countries in the region].’51  
 The only type of external pressures on the King to pursue a policy of gradual 
democratisation can be labelled as second order pressures, as they are quite diffuse. The 
end of the Cold War represented a watershed in ideological terms: socialism collapsed 
and the values of the West had won. Accordingly, most authoritarian countries felt 
compelled to adapt their domestic political and economic institutions to the winning 
values of democracy and liberalism to profit from the new-look international system. 
Even countries that had been in the Western camp and whose authoritarianism had been 
tolerated felt that changes needed to be introduced to satisfy the needs of the West-
dominated international community. It follows that Hassan II needed to revise the 
institutional make-up of the country. Other second-order pressures came from what can 
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be termed the global civil society, which was very much concerned with issues of human 
rights abuses. An example of such influence has been the publication of the book Notre 
Ami Le Roi, which highlighted the Kingdom’s brutal practices in relation to political 
opposition and human rights.52 The problem with these types of pressures is that they 
generate short-time indignation and short-time reactions, but fail in being successful in 
altering government policy in the longer term if they are not accompanied by the weight 
of state’s diplomacy.  Again, the relevance of realism should be emphasised.    
 While the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the socialist ideology did not 
dramatically change the King’s structure of incentives, they had a much more profound 
impact on the secular opposition parties. The popular Socialist Party in particular could 
not rely any longer on any ideological legitimacy conferred by socialism. Furthermore, 
the lack of interest in real democratisation on the part of powerful international actors 
meant that such secular parties found themselves forced into accepting the alternance 
offered by Hassan II if they wanted any saying at all in the running of the country. Their 
effectiveness in government is however severely limited due to the tight control the King 
exercises on key governmental functions and due to the lack of alternative economic 
policies to the ones dictated by international financial institutions. The very poor socio-
economic conditions have given rise to strong Islamist movements and both the King and 
the secular opposition parties are afraid of their emergence and therefore adopt 
authoritarian measures to deal with them. This is quite paradoxical, as many members of 
the secular parties were in the past victims of similar abusive policies. Aboubakr Jamai 
argues that the entire political experience of the alternance is a failure precisely because 
‘what the left denounced and wanted to reform when in opposition is precisely what they 
fear reforming now that they are in government.’53 
 
Political Islamism in Morocco 
 The lax attitude of the international community regarding Moroccan authoritarian 
pluralism is today explained by the nature of the real Moroccan opposition. The effects of 
the international context are particularly intense when it comes to examine the opposition 
Islamist movements. Eheteshami notes that ‘the international environment for the 
interaction between Islam and democracy is a particularly important fact.’54  
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Currently, there are three strands of Islamism in the country.55 First of all, there is 
a legally recognised political formation (the Party for Justice and Development) that 
participates to the political life of the country. It is allowed to participate because it is a 
party able to compromise with the regime and can be co-opted. For instance, upon 
request by the authorities, the party decided not to run candidates in all constituencies at 
the 2003 local elections precisely to avoid sweeping the board and embarrassing the King 
with a significant Islamist electoral victory.  Secondly, there is the ‘barely tolerated’56 
and very popular Justice and Charity Association founded by the long time dissident 
Sheikh Abd al-Salam Yassine. This association operates like a social movement 
providing services and assistance to the poorer sections of society and is preoccupied 
with Islamising society from below. This does not mean that the association does not 
have a political line. The Sheikh is very outspoken in his criticism of the Crown, which is 
blamed for the ills of Moroccan society (poverty, corruption of moral values, deference to 
the West, social atomisation) and Islam is pointed out as the solution to all these 
difficulties.57 Finally, there is the clandestine Salafist Jihad, a group devoted to 
overthrowing the government through violence. It is a minoritarian strand and does not 
enjoy the overt nor covert support of the other groups examined.     
 The emergence of Islamism as a tool of political opposition in Morocco 
challenges the conventional wisdom about the King’s religious legitimacy. The King 
enjoys this legitimacy as a direct descendent of the Prophet, but this is not sufficient to 
halt the spreading of Islam as a vehicle for political opposition because the movements 
using it have real economic, political and social grievances to build their support on.  
There are three different sets of influences that contributed to the rise of political Islam in 
Morocco. First of all, the failure of ideologies imported from the West combined with 
perceived great Islamic victories against powerful enemies (i.e. the Shah in Iran) 
contributed to make Islam a very popular ideological tool. Islam as the solution began to 
be the slogan also given the Iranian revolution, the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan by an 
Islamic guerrilla and the Palestinian Intifada. All these events touched Morocco only 
very marginally, but contributed to create an ideological climate favourable to Islamist 
movements, which were also busy providing much needed services to the population.58  
Exchanges of ideas can have a very significant effect in international politics.59 Secondly, 
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the Gulf crisis and subsequent war of 1991 contributed to make Islamic movements a 
serious player on the Moroccan political scene. The vast majority of the population was 
not necessarily sympathetic to Saddam Hussein, but the crisis served to highlight the 
double standards of the West when dealing with the Arab world. Given that King Hassan 
II had committed the country to support the US-led coalition, popular opposition to the 
war gave the Islamists a considerable boost to raise their political profile. Finally, the 
neo-liberal economic policies forced on the Morocco contributed to the strengthening of 
the Islamist movements. The economic and social costs of such reforms are enormous 
and entailed the emergence of a small class of nouveaux riches, while the vast majority of 
the population struggles to survive.60 Capitalising on the negative effects of such reforms, 
the Islamist movement can play the social justice card. Sheikh Yassine in particular is 
very vocal on this point and he is very much concerned with the international 
environment and the constraints that derive from it when it comes to the choices that 
Morocco faces.     
When analysing the reasons for the failure of the process of democratisation to 
consolidate, the role of international factors is very relevant. Whereby similar processes 
in Latin America, Eastern Europe, East Asia have been supported by the leading actors in 
the international system, democratisation in the Arab world is instead treated with much 
suspicion because of the nature of the ‘unreasonable’ Islamist opposition. Gambill argues 
for instance that ‘the proposition that authoritarianism in the Arab world is sustained by 
the absence or weakness of external forces’61 should be examined further and he affirms 
that such a factor is decisive in explaining the Arab democracy deficit. In the case of 
Morocco, the attitude of the United States, France and to a lesser extent the European 
Union is the external variable that stifled consolidation. The main driving force behind 
the behaviour of these actors has been the necessity to ensure regional stability, which, 
they argue, would be compromised by the arrival to power of an Islamist movement. It is 
for this reason that they generally tend to support more secular parties that, however, do 
not enjoy great popular support or are often co-opted by the regime, therefore losing 
much of their oppositional nature.  
The end of the Cold War seemed to usher in a new era: the age of liberalism 
would finally dawn on international politics. It was believed that liberal-democracy 
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would spread across the globe and the UN would become the forum where international 
disputes would be settled and where actions in breach of international law would be 
condemned and punished. This enthusiasm did not last very long and the West became 
soon preoccupied with the rise of political Islam, which carried a revolutionary message 
and questioned the status quo of the international system.62 The 1991 Gulf War showed 
to western countries how little support and credibility they actually enjoyed in the Arab 
world and made them realise that they were increasingly dependent on authoritarian 
leaders in the region to maintain the stability necessary to continue extracting benefits. 
There is very little doubt that the fear of an Islamist party coming to power through free 
and fair elections drove policies in the 1990s and well into the new century. Such an 
attitude towards Islamist movements is not dictated, although it is justified, by a 
principled policy of defending democracy and human rights. Rather, it is dictated by the 
necessity to avoid having a party in power that would question the fundamental tenets 
upon which the current international system is built on. Thus, the provision of political 
legitimacy in international forums, the granting of credits and loans to keep the economy 
afloat and the sale of arms to counter any militant resistance are all instruments used to 
support the Moroccan Kingdom. No serious attempt has been made to effectively 
promote democratic change either through carrots or sticks. In turn, such support 
considerably lowers the costs of repression of the Moroccan ruling elites. A few 
examples suffice to demonstrate this. The recent war on terror has helped Morocco to 
justify its repressive and authoritarian policies with the blessing of the US government, 
who just signed a free-trade agreement with Morocco, which does not include any 
conditionality in terms of political reforms. France also cancelled a portion of Morocco’s 
debt during the King’s visit to Paris in 2000.63 While all these measures could be 
potentially used to put pressure on the regime to engage in serious political reforms, they 
end up be functioning as support for the status quo.  No widespread international 
condemnation of Morocco has been issued following the publication of the recent 
Amnesty International report detailing the repressive practices of the regime.64 Finally, 
military cooperation with NATO gives Morocco both international legitimacy and 
contacts with European and American counterparts. In a country where socio-economic 
indicators are very poor, military expenses represent 2.3 billion US dollars in 2003.65    
 22 
How important are these external factors in stalling democratisation? It is quite 
difficult to assess the relative importance of the external over the internal because the two 
cannot be easily separated and measured. However, it is the case that the external 
environment is not conducive to full democratisation because of the nature of the 
opposition. Thus, domestic ruling elites and international actors interact in a complex 
game to support each other to the detriment of electoral democracy.  
 
Conclusion 
 International factors are an important part of the story of transitions and they 
should be incorporated in the analysis of such processes. The case of Morocco shows that 
there are external-internal linkages that need to be examined to understand its stalled 
democratisation. However, strong causal mechanisms are extremely difficult to prove and 
this probably explains the prevalent focus on domestic politics and choices. In spite of 
this, the Moroccan case indicates that weak causal inferences can be made. The 
theoretical framework proposed emphasises the role of agency over structure and there is 
evidence to suggest that internal-external linkages determine the path of the transition 
through interaction.  
Regarding Morocco, while the 1983 decision to open up the political system was 
based on an autonomous domestic decision-making process, the subsequent development 
of the transition and its failed consolidation are influenced by the external environment. 
This is particularly evident when we analyse the nature of the opposition. There is very 
little doubt that international factors helped the Islamist movement grow even in a 
country that had been previously thought immune from such phenomenon.66 Also, there 
is very little doubt that it is precisely the emergence of such movement that lowered the 
costs of repression in light of the attitudes of countries and organisations. The costs have 
been lowered to such an extent that authoritarianism is being rewarded for keeping the 
Islamist movement out of power. This is done through economic incentives, absence of 
conditionality, support for weak secular parties, military aid and international legitimacy.  
 In terms of the literature on democratisation, it emerges that the external 
intervention to change the cost and benefit analysis of the domestic actors is not always 
intended to support democracy. At times it is intended to stifle it. In terms of international 
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relations literature, it is worth noting that peace and stability are not necessarily achieved 
through the spread of democracy or liberal values. Quite the opposite is in fact true if we 
take the case of Morocco on board. The use of realist concepts can account for the anti-
democratic impact of foreign policies towards Morocco. The stalled democratisation of 
country cannot be solely laid at the door of the international community, but the actions 
undertaken by external actors have strengthened the current regime with their focus on 
economic openness and façade democratic elections. The nature of the opposition seems 
to worry more than the authoritarian nature of the current ruler.  This view is well 
summarised by Zakaria, who argues that: ‘the Arab rulers of the Middle East are 
autocratic, corrupt, and heavy-handed. But they are still more liberal, tolerant, and 
pluralistic than those who would likely replace them.’67 As long as this remains the 
perception at policy-making level, the international context is likely to continue to 
support authoritarianism or ‘controlled’ democracy.     
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